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United Kingdom
My subject is the United Kingdom response to what it sees as excessive
claims to jurisdiction, and, in particular, the United Kingdom's legislative
response-the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980-what you would
call a blocking statute. I am not only referring to what is loosely called
"extraterritoriality" where one country seeks to apply its laws to activities
outside its territory, but also to the application of one country's laws to
activities which by their nature, or because of the transnational character of
the legal entities involved, directly affect the interests of two or more
countries. It will suffice perhaps to say that such jurisdiction is assumed by
United States courts and authorities in circumstances in which other states,
notably the United Kingdom (but by no means alone amongst other states),
object on principles of international law, comity, and even by the assertion
of treaty rights. This adds the spice as well as the frustration to transnational
litigation: private disputes produce confrontation between nations.
Sovereignty is at stake-but not only sovereignty to be protected for its own
sake but because infringements of sovereignty arising out of the application
of economic laws can fundamentally affect the trading interests of other
states.
It is tempting to think that there would not be such confrontation between
states if the subject matter of private litigation was treated the same by the
laws of our respective states. In principle, the dispute about sovereignty
would remain but the assumption of jurisdiction, rightly or wrongly, would
not produce results that would be thought to affect adversely the interests of
other states. The fact that the laws of our respective states are not the same
or that our policies, though broadly alike, are not the same in detail of
application is what produces the situations to be debated, if not exploited, in
private transnational litigation.
*Solicitor, Department of Trade and Industry, London, England.
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I. U.K. Laws
A word or two about United Kingdom laws. We have economic laws-
what we call restrictive trade practices legislation, monopolies and mergers
legislation and more recently our Competition Act of 1980. These are not,
however, free standing statutes to be invoked by public authorities and
private litigants alike. In the case of restrictive trade practice agreements
these are required to be registered with the Director General of Fair Trading
and he, given a few discretionary exemptions, is under a duty to refer them
to a court-a special restrictive trade practices court which is a division of
the High Court-where there is a presumption that they are against the
public interest unless the parties can satisfy the court to the contrary on
certain specified grounds. Condemnation by the court leads to orders pro-
hibiting the parties from giving effect to the agreements and from making
future agreements to the like effect. Private litigation might ensue from the
operation of unregistered or void agreements if damage suffered as a result
of their operation can be established.
Monopoly and merger control is in the hands of government which may
refer qualifying monopoly situations or mergers for investigation by the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. If that body finds that they are
against the public interest then government has a discretionary power to
make orders remedying or preventing the adverse findings of the Commis-
sion. Likewise under the Competition Act anti-competitive practices might
be referred by the Director General for investigation and report by the
Commission with resulting order-making powers. Apart from these statu-
tory provisions there is of course the common law whereby acts done in
execution of agreements entered into by two or more are actionable in tort
but only if done for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, not merely for the
purpose of protecting their owr interests.'
II. U.S. Law Compared
To state English law briefly thus demonstrates how unlike it is to the laws
of the United States. To an English lawyer looking at the Sherman Act one is
struck by its brevity and its apparent clarity. What we cannot quite compre-
hend is how the United States courts have managed to turn it into such an
instrument of torture. We are not used to trusting to our courts such
extensive powers. That your courts make, as well as declare, the law has two
consequences which significantly affect our attitudes to U.S. assumptions of
jurisdiction. First, it is difficult to state at any given time what the law is.
1. There is a long line of English authorities on this point, but the most interesting recent
statement is to be found in Lonrho Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (No.2) [1982] A.C. 173.
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There appears to us to be no real certainty. Secondly, it adds to the difficulty
of negotiating with U.S. authorities whose attitude is, and no doubt under
your constitution probably has to be, that certain matters must be left to be
determined by the courts.
I shall not dwell upon the differences in the application of our common
policies. The pipeline controversy is over and as Mr. Davis Robinson said
when addressing the International Division of the District of Columbia bar
in June last year, "It was an exceptional case and therefore does not provide
a good basis on which to analyze the broad range of legal and diplomatic
issues arising in the area of conflicts of jurisdiction." 2 For us however, it
remains a notorious example of what we most strongly object to and our
hope too is that it should be regarded as an exceptional case not to be
repeated.
The area of dispute concerning substantive jurisdiction is not the only one
relevant to the response of other nations. Extensive claims to exercise
personal jurisdiction over foreigners largely derives from and is sought to be
justified by relation to the substantive jurisdiction claimed. It is to this area
of personal jurisdiction that the foreign governmental responses may be
most effectively directed. And in doing so the distinction is drawn between
the traditional assistance and co-operation given to the U.S. courts and the
courts of other nations in ordinary commercial litigation and in litigation
arising from the enforcement of public economic laws like the Sherman Act.
There are two other matters which do affect the attitudes of other nations,
particularly the United Kingdom. The first is that the exercise by the United
States of jurisdiction in antitrust matters is penal, because no distinction is
seen between proceedings brought by the state to seek a criminal penalty
and those brought by private individuals to enforce a monetary penalty. The
second point relates to some aspects of the U.S. judicial system where it
seems that "the plaintiff holds all the cards" as Lord Denning put it in the
Smith v. Kline case3 when in his picturesque language he referred to the
contingent fees system, to trial by jury and to your liberal pre-trial discovery
procedures. At this point I would remind you that, as in the case of the
English language, the similarity between the legal traditions and procedures
in the United States and the United Kingdom conceal many fundamental
differences, not the least of which is that in the United States the process of
litigation seems to be regarded as a public good whereas in the United
Kingdom we have traditionally seen it as one to be controlled and where
disputes should if possible be settled amicably rather than in the courts.
2. Remarks of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, before the Interna-
tional Division of the District of Columbia Bar, June 7, 1983.
3. Smith, Kline & French v. Block [1982] 2 All E.R. 72.
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III. Blocking Statutes/Protective Legislation
Blocking statutes as you would call them-in the United Kingdom we
prefer to say protective legislation-do not, of course, solve the underlying
dispute. They might be said to make matters worse in the sense that
confrontation becomes public and complete. But in the United Kingdom we
see our legislation as a legitimate and pragmatic response to a situation
which has been developing over many years and which has recently become
more acute. I note the very recent judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia 4 where the majority judgment in impeccable judicial
language referred to the actions of the United Kingdom government under
its statute as "arrogant," 5 "scarcely meeting the standard of Kant" 6 and as
"intent upon frustrating the antitrust policies of the elective branches of the
American government." 7 For the United Kingdom, however, our blocking
legislation emphasizes the point that insofar as the application or enforce-
ment of foreign laws requires the active assistance or passive acquiescence of
the United Kingdom, regard must be had to the trading interests of the
United Kingdom. Hence the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980,
which superseded the earlier and more limited Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act of 1964. Sections 1 and 2 of the 1980 Act deal
with the response to the assumption of excessive substantive jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction claims. These sections have been used recently in
connection with two notable disputes: the pipeline and Laker cases.
A. PROTECTION OF TRADING INTERESTS ACT, 1980
Section 1 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 only applies to
such measures made by direct order by the Secretary of State. To make such
an order-which, incidentally, is a piece of subordinate legislation subject to
annulment by resolution of either House of Parliament-it has to appear to
the Secretary of State that the measures in question: (a) have been or are
proposed to be taken by or under the laws of any overseas country for
regulating or controlling international trade; and (b) that insofar as they
apply or would apply to things done or to be done outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the overseas country by persons carrying on business in the
United Kingdom, are damaging to the trading interests of the United
Kingdom.
4. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines and KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines,
731 F.2d 909 (1984).
5. Id. at 940-Ed.
6. 731 F.2d 909, 941-ED.
7. 731 F.2d 909, 940-ED.
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B. PIPELINE CASE
In the pipeline case an order was made directing the section to apply to
parts of the export administration regulations made under the United States
Export Administration Act insofar as they concerned re-exports or exports
from the United Kingdom.8 No immediate consequences flowed from the
making of the order, but having made such an order the Secretary of State
was then empowered to do two further things. First, he could make a further
order requiring persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom to
notify him of any requirement or prohibition imposed or threatened to be
imposed pursuant to the export administration measures. Secondly, the
Secretary of State could give directions to persons carrying on business in
the United Kingdom prohibiting compliance with any requirements or
prohibitions. In the pipeline case no order was made requiring notifications
but after an interval of several weeks, diplomatic efforts to end the disputes
having by then not succeeded, directions were given to a total of six United
Kingdom companies prohibiting compliance with any requirement or pro-
hibition of the U.S. export regulations, insofar as those regulations pur-
ported to affect the exportation from the United Kingdom of goods in-
tended for use in connection with the Trans-Siberian pipeline project.
The effect of the directions was as a matter of English law to free the
United Kingdom companies from the shackles of the U.S. prohibition of
re-exports to the Soviet Union. What the United Kingdom government was
doing was to prohibit compliance with that prohibition. The directions did
not produce a mandatory requirement on the United Kingdom companies
to export or re-export to the USSR. They were left to make a free choice but
insofar as any failure to complete performance of their contracts to export
from the United Kingdom had been subject to action in the English courts
the U.S. prohibition could not have been set up as a defense.
C. LAKER CASE
That section has been used again very recently in the Laker case, 9 where
the act has been applied to both the Sherman and the Clayton Act provi-
sions. Following from that, particular directions have been given to persons
in the United Kingdom under Section 2 from complying with any require-
ments of the U.S. authorities, both courts, the Grand Jury and the Depart-
ment of Justice, from producing commercial information and also from
producing documents in the United Kingdom.
8. See generally Boyd & Whisman, The U.S. Law of Export Controls, 19 INT'L LAW. 483
(1984) - ED.
9. See supra note 4 - ED.
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Finally, I would like to emphasize a general point which I think is impor-
tant to understand. These sections of the 1980 Act have no automatic
application. They are discretionary powers which will by no means be used
in every case in which they could be used. Whether or not they are used in
any particular case, will depend upon such factors as whether in the view of
the United Kingdom, the subject matter of investigation is within the
legitimate jurisdiction of the foreign country, whether the United King-
dom's significant interests are involved and whether a genuine need for
documents is demonstrated, and whether the scope of compulsory discovery
is consistent with practice in the United Kingdom-the latter point, of
course, relates to the United Kingdom attitude to fishing discoveries. From
that, it will be perceived that the United Kingdom legislation is not what Mr.
Davis Robinson has called a "knee-jerk response." It is in no way doctri-
naire.
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